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Implicit government obligations represent the lion's share of government liabilities in the U.S. and
many other countries.  Yet these liabilities are rarely measured, let alone properly adjusted for their
risk.  This paper shows, by example, how modern asset pricing can be used to value implicit fiscal
debts taking into account their risk properties.  The example is the U.S. Social Security System's net
liability to working-age Americans.  Marking this debt to market makes a big difference; its market
value is 23 percent larger than the Social Security trustees' valuation method suggests.
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In most developed countries and in many developing ones, commitments to make transfer 
payments and collect receipts represent the lion’s share of government obligations and 
resources. Often referred to as implicit liabilities and assets, they typically are either 
ignored in assessing fiscal sustainability or valued on a piecemeal basis using ad hoc 
techniques. The justification for this practice generally offered is twofold.  First, implicit 
fiscal commitments do not represent legal liabilities. Second, implicit commitments are 
difficult to value given their uncertain and extended nature.  
 
This rationale may assuage accountants, but it offers little comfort to economists or, 
indeed, to anyone concerned with economic policy.  The immense gulf between 
countries’ true indebtedness and what’s being measured means countries are largely 
driving blind with respect to their fiscal affairs. Generational accounting, developed by 
Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991), attempts to remedy this situation. Its 
framework is the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, and it treats all 
government commitments on a consistent basis regardless of their legal status.   
 
These advantages notwithstanding, a major shortcoming of generational accounting as 
well as related measurements
1 is the failure to adjust future government flows properly 
for risk. Generational accountants usually value the government’s future payments and 
receipts by adding a risk premium to the risk-free discount rate.  But their choice of risk 
premiums has no clear theoretical or empirical basis.   
 
This paper presents a method for properly valuing implicit government debt.  It treats 
government benefit obligations and tax claims as non-traded financial assets and applies 
what are now standard asset-pricing techniques to their valuation.  In particular, we use 
Ross’ (1976a, 1976b) Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) and its associated risk-neutral, 
derivative-pricing and process-free pricing theories (see Cox and Ross, 1976 and Ross, 
1978).  Our method treats future government payments and receipts as securities whose 
returns comprise two components – a market component, which is spanned by traded 
securities, and an idiosyncratic component, which can be fully diversified.  
 
We apply our pricing method (henceforth referenced as APT) to value Social Security’s 
net retirement benefit liability to working-age Americans (those aged 26 to 60).
2  Our 
valuation determines how much the U.S. government would have to pay private parties or 
foreign governments to retire this liability.   
 
Marking this implicit debt to market makes a big difference – a 23 percent difference to 
be precise.  The 2005 (our benchmark year) liability equals $10.4 trillion when marked to 
market, but $8.5 trillion when valued using Social Security Administration (SSA) 
methodology.   
                                                 
1 See, for example, the 75-year and infinite horizon liability calculations reported in the annual OASDI 
Trustees Reports.  
2 Net retirement liability refers to Social Security’s obligation to pay OAI retirement benefits net of OAI 
taxes.       2
 
Finding such a large discrepancy could be expected.  The Social Security Trustees’ 
unfunded liability calculation, reported in their annual Trustees Report, makes no 
adjustment for uncertain future economy-wide average wage growth, which is so 
determinative of workers’ future benefits and taxes.
3  The Trustees also make no attempt 
to mark their risk-free benefit obligations to market notwithstanding the availability of 
risk-free securities to do such pricing.  These obligations include retirement benefits 
being made to current retirees as well as retirement benefits that will be made to current 
workers once their initial benefit level is determined.  
 
Social Security’s failure to adjust formally for uncertainty in average real-wage growth is 
surprising given that a) this growth rate has been highly variable and b) Social Security’s 
benefit obligations and tax receipts represent, in large part, wage-growth derivatives.   
 
Figure 1 documents annual swings in real growth rates between 1951 and 2005.
4  Over 
this period, the average real wage has grown by as much as 6.4 percent in a single year 





























































The variability of real wage growth suggests there could be risk here to price, but it tells 
us nothing about the degree to which implicit claims to growth in the real wage are 
valued in the market.  For it is the covariance of real wage growth and market returns, 
                                                 
3 The trustees do examine the sensitivity of their liability measures to alternative economic and 
demographic assumptions.  But this is no substitute for proper risk adjustment. 
4 http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/AWI.html#Series reports Social Security’s nominal average wage 
series, which we adjust for inflation using the CPI.     3
together with the mean real-wage growth rate that determines the current price of an 
implicit wage-growth security.   
 
As we show, a one-year, $1 investment in the wage-growth security is worth $0.988 
according to APT.  Social Security’s valuation of such a claim is quite similar -- $0.982.
5 
But the APT and SSA valuations of multi-year wage growth securities (and the 
associated valuations of out-year benefits and taxes) diverge to an increasing degree the 
longer the duration of the relevant wage-growth security.  For example, the APT value of 
a 10-year wage growth security is $.862; the corresponding SSA valuation is $.838.  In 
the case of a 35-year wage growth security, the APT and SSA valuations are $0.588 and 
$.542, respectively.  
  
Since the benefits to be paid to current workers postdate the taxes to be collected from 
them, the duration-dependent divergence of APT and SSA wage-growth valuations and 
the dependence of benefits and taxes on wage growth suggest that Social Security is 
systematically understating its net liability to current workers.  But the trustees make a 
second valuation mistake that more than offsets the first.   
 
This second mistake involves the valuation of the benefits beyond those received in the 
first year of eligibility.  These benefits are paid out as inflation-indexed annuities and 
should be actuarially priced using the prevailing Treasury Inflation Protected Securities 
(TIPS) term structure.
6  In 2005 the average annual real yields on TIPS was 1.50 percent, 
1.63 percent, 1.81 percent, and 1.97 percent for 5, 7, 10, and 20 year maturities, 
respectively.
7  Each of these yields is considerably lower than the 2.9 percent real yield 
used by SSA in their 2005 unfunded liability calculations. Using the TIPS term structure, 
the value of a $1 dollar single-life real annuity for a 62 year-old male in 2005 is $15.43.  
This is 8.8 percent higher than SSA’s $14.18 valuation.
8   
 
Thus, Social Security’s trustees appear, in part, to be undervaluing benefits relative to 
taxes and, in part, overvaluing benefits relative to taxes, with the latter mistake 
quantitatively exceeding the former.
9  
 
Our paper proceeds in section 2 with Baxter’s (2001) and Baxter and King’s (2002) 
observation that a household’s future Social Security benefits and, by extension, its future 
Social Security taxes, can be viewed as financial assets, albeit ones with special market 
                                                 
5 Social Security assumes real wages will grow, on average, by 1.1 percent and discounts, as indicated, at a 
2.9 percent rate.  
6 See www.federalreserve.gov/release/h15.data.htm 
7 Unfortunately, issuance of 30-year TIPs was suspended between October 2001 and February 2006. 
8 Inflation-indexed annuities are sold on the market.  Indeed, Vanguard’s price for this annuity is $19.44, 
which is 26.0 percent higher than our valuation (and 37.1 percent higher than Social Security’s).  Using 
these market prices for real annuities, while tempting, would, we think be inappropriate given that adverse 
selection surely explains much of the 26.0 percent differential and doesn’t come into play in valuing 
annuities provided to all members of particular cohorts.  
9 The former mistake involves failing to account for risk with respect to initial benefit awards and tax 
payments, whereas the latter mistake involves failure to account for safety with respect to the stream of 
benefit payments once they commence.    4
and idiosyncratic return properties.  We clarify these return properties and show how to 
value Social Security net retirement benefits using risk-neutral pricing and arbitrage-
pricing theory.   
 
Section 3 shows how one can measure the idiosyncratic components of Social Security 
benefits and taxes. It also presents our wage-growth valuation regressions and compares 
APT valuation of a $1 wage-growth security with SSA valuation.   
 
Section 4 describes our use of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data to 
estimate a random effects model of individuals’ annual relative earnings – their annual 
earnings relative to Social Security’s measure of economy-wide, average annual earnings.  
We use this model to determine the predictable, idiosyncratic component of future 
relative earnings and, thus, of future benefit claims and tax obligations.  When it comes to 
taxes, we treat 7.9 percentage points of the 10.6 percentage point combined employer and 
employee OASI (Old Age Survivor Insurance) payroll tax rate as the tax used to finance 
OAI retirement benefits.
10  We then combine market-pricing and idiosyncratic-pricing 
elements to calculate the average value of benefit claims and tax obligations by age, sex, 
and education.  Finally, we apply age-, sex-, and education-specific population weights to 
determine, using both APT and SSA methodologies, the aggregate values of future Social 
Security net benefits payable to working-age Americans.   
 
Since our main focus is on market-pricing differences in valuing Social Security, we 
incorporate the same idiosyncratic component in both our SSA and APT valuations.
11 
Thus, the aforementioned 23 percent difference in aggregate APT and SSA net liability 
measures is purely attributable to differences in market pricing, specifically how APT 
and SSA value wage growth and inflation-indexed annuities.  
   
Section 5 illustrates section 4’s analysis by comparing APT and SSA 2005 benefit, tax, 
and net retirement-liability valuations for selected demographic groups. We then present 
the aggregate valuations under the APT and SSA methodologies, decomposing the 23 
percent net liability difference into benefit and tax components.  Section 6 responds to 
potential criticisms of our approach.  And section 7 concludes by pointing out that the 







                                                 
10 This is 10.6 percent times .745, which is the 2006 ratio of retiree benefits to total OASI benefits as 
reported in the 2007 OASDI Trustees Report.  
11 Social Security’s treatment of the idiosyncratic components of future benefit and tax valuations appears 
to be similar to ours with the exception that we take into account workers’ education in projecting their 
future earnings.  The 2008 OASDI Trustees Report states “Future average awarded PIAs are calculated 
from projected earnings histories, which are developed using a combination of the actual earnings histories 
associated with a sample of awards based on 2004 entitlements, and more recent actual earnings levels by 
age and sex for covered workers.”   5
2. Valuing Social Security Retirement Benefits and Taxes 
 
Let bi stand for the full retirement benefit or Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) available 
to worker i.  This benefit is a concave function of the worker’s Average Indexed Monthly 
Earnings (AIME).  The AIME is, in turn, calculated by first accumulating worker i’s past 
covered earnings in each year starting from the year the worker was age 16 and 
continuing to the year the worker reaches age 60.  The accumulation factor is based on 
the economy-wide growth in average total (uncovered as well as covered) monthly 
earnings.  Next the 35 largest values of these indexed earnings plus worker i’s nominal 
earnings received after age 60 are averaged to form the AIME.  
 
The rate of accumulation is determined by the real growth in economy-wide averaged 
earnings.  For simplicity, we assume that workers’ 35 years of highest earnings occur 
between ages 26 through 60 and that the worker retires at age 60.   
 
The PIA is inflation-adjusted to ensure the same real PIA is used regardless of when the 
worker elects to start collecting benefits.  Workers can being collecting benefits as early 
as age 62 and as late as age 70.  Deviations in workers’ initial collection ages from their 
ages of full retirement trigger actuarial reductions or increases in the retirement benefit.  
We assume that all current workers begin collecting their benefits at age 62.
12  
 
In (1), wi ,j denotes the covered (up to the Social Security earnings ceiling) wage earned 
by worker i in year j, τi references worker i’s year of birth, gk stands for the growth rate of 
average real earnings in year k, and 374 refers to 35 years times 12 months. 
 





























where  60 + i fτ  captures the PIA benefit formula and its argument is worker i’s PIA. 
 
Let   j w  stand for the level of economy-wide, real average earnings in year j.  Define the 
ratio of worker i’s covered earnings in year j to  j w by zi,j, i.e.,    
 
(2)   j j i j i w z w , , ≡ .  
 
Substituting (2) into (1) yields 
                                                 
12 Assuming that Social Security’s actuarial adjustment is based on the same real interest rate as used in its 
unfunded liability valuation, SSA valuation of its net liability to current workers should be independent of 
when workers collect their benefits.  On the other hand, the APT valuation of this net liability will be larger 
the later workers collect because Social Security will provide larger benefit increases in return for delaying 
benefit collection that the market indicates is actuarially fair.  Thus, in assuming that current workers begin 
collecting retirement benefits at age 62, we are biasing down our estimate of Social Security’s 
understatement of its net liability to current workers.    6
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where  i z is one twelfth the average annual value of zi,j. 
 
Social Security indexes not just a worker’s past earnings to economy-wide average 
covered earnings; it also indexes the brackets in its year-t benefit function ft( ).  Thus, 
other things equal, if  60 + i wτ  is twice as large, the value of bi will be twice as large; i.e.,  
 
(4)   ) , ( ) ( 60 60 60 60 + + + + =
i i i i w w z f w z f i i τ τ τ τ , 
 
where f( , ) is homogeneous of degree one in  60 + i wτ .  Using this property, we can write 
 
(5)   60 ) ( + =




(6)   ) 1 , ( ) ( i i z f z h ≡ . 
 
In what follows, we assume that  ) ( i z h  and  60 + i wτ  are independently distributed.  
 
Note that for someone born in year τ, the current (year t) average covered wage,  t w , is 
related to the average covered wage in year τ+60 according to 
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Equations (5) and (7) imply 
 
(8)   ) 1 ( ) (
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According to (8), worker i’s full retirement benefit, bi, is equivalent to what would be 
earned by investing the amount  t i w z h ) (  at time t and holding it until time τi+60 in a 
wage-growth security, i.e., a security that compounds at the rate of growth of average real 
wages.  Of course, as with any time-t risky investment, the ultimate value of  ) ( i z h at time 
τi+60 is unknown.  Yet enough is known at time t to determine the value of bi.   
   7
Note that the cross-sectional average of  i z is 1.  We assume that the terms  i z - 1 have no 
value much like the deviations of individual insurance claims from the industry average 
have no value.  What matters for value, then, is simply the expected value of  ) ( i z h , 
E[ ) ( i z h ]. 
 
Given that  ) ( i z h is independent of  60 + i wτ  and that the valuation operator is linear, we can 
write the value of the benefit claim as 
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where V( ) stands for the valuation function.  
 
 
A straightforward argument, laid out in the appendix and motivated by financial pricing 
theory, lets us determine the current value of ) 1 (
60






, which we refer to as a $1 wage-
growth security with maturity τi+60–t.  To form the valuation, all we need find is a 
portfolio of traded securities whose payoff mimics the final real wage up to some 
idiosyncratic terms.  These terms are assumed not to matter for valuation because they 
are uncorrelated with the returns to marketed securities.   
 
Assume that the annual growth rate, gt, of the real wage has the following structure where 
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The appendix demonstrates that the final real-wage payment can be replicated by a 
portfolio of the (real) bond and the assets, fi,t, that is rebalanced every year.  The cost of 






































where r denotes the real rate of interest, which we assume is constant.  If there is a term 
structure of real rates available from, say, inflation-protected bonds, then the formula 
becomes:  
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These formulas assume that only contemporaneous asset returns price the wage growth 
security.  As also shown in the Appendix, the formulas are more complex if lagged as 
well as contemporaneous asset returns predict current wage growth.  The complexity 
involves the need to adjust for the fact that lagged returns predict current and future wage 
growth. While the case of multiple lags is quite complex, the formulas follow quite 

































where the differences between equations (14) and (15) reflect the impact of lagged asset 
returns on expected future wage growth.  To be more precise, the βjs are the loadings on 
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Incorporating Survival to Age 62 and Annuity Valuation 
 
The above treats Social Security benefits as a one-year payoff of a wage-growth security 
derivative, with the payoff occurring in the year the worker reaches age 60.  This is 
inappropriate for four reasons.  First, under our assumption that workers take early 
retirement benefits, benefits commence at 62.  Second, the worker may not survive from 
her current age to age 62.  Third, receiving benefits at age 62, rather than full retirement 
age, triggers an actuarial reduction, the size of which depends on the worker’s year of 
birth.  Fourth, the benefit starting at age 62 is not a one-year payment, but continues each 
year in the future conditional on the worker’s survival.   
   9
Equation (17) modifies (15) to arrive at Vt(Bi) -- the time-t APT value of worker i’s 
lifetime benefits, Bi.   In the formula, we multiply Vt(bi) by a) c – a two year real discount 
factor that discounts, at the market’s safe real rate, for the fact that benefits don’t begin at 
age 60, but rather at age 62, b)  62 , , , i t i q τ -- the time-t probability that worker i, who was 
born at time τi, survives to age 62, c)
i τ μ -- the early-retirement benefit reduction factor for 
workers born in year τi who begin benefit receipt at age 62, and d) 
i i τ δ , -- the actuarially 
discounted present value of a $1 real annuity beginning at age 62 payable to worker i who 
is born in year τi, where the discounting is at the market’s safe real term structure and 
goes back to age 62.      
 
(17)  
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SSA’s Benefit Valuation Formula  
 
The corresponding SSA valuation,  ) ( ˆ
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where  r  and g  reference, respectively, Social Security’s assumed 2.9 percent real 
discount rate and 1.1 percent real-wage growth rate.  Clearly the final terms in equations 
(17) and (18) differ, which reflects differences in APT and SSA valuations of real wage 
growth.  But the two-year discount factor,  c ˆ, and the actuarial value of the annuity, 
i i τ δ ,
)
, 
also differ from their equation (17) counterparts because they too incorporate SSA’s 
assumed 2.9 percent discount rate rather than the prevailing TIPs term structure.  
 
 
Measuring the Idiosyncratic Component of Benefit Valuation 
 
The value of  t w   for our base year, t=2005, is reported by the Social Security 
administration, so the remaining question is how to determine the value of the 
idiosyncratic component, ) ( i t z h E .  Our method is to use our aforementioned random-
effects model of relative earnings to simulate the average value of  ) ( i z h by individual age 
in 2005, sex, and education group.  The education groups are less than high school, high 
school, and college or more.   
 
Our random effects model, which we estimate separately for each of the six education 
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where i φ  is the random effect, and ait and bt reference, respectively, worker i’s age in year 
t and her year of birth (i.e., t - ait).  The term  it ε  is a transitory error.  
 
To determine the average value of  ) ( i z h  for agents in 2005 of a given sex and education 
group who were born in year bi (who were a given age in 2005), we draw 100,000 values 
of i α ; i.e., we consider 100,000 agents with specific random effects.  For each agent  we 
draw 35 values of  it ε  -- starting for the year the agent was age 26 and continuing through 
the year the agent will be age 60.  For each year, m, of these 35 years, we evaluate the 
right-hand-side of (19) using the values of the agent’s  i α  and  i b  as well as the value of 
it ε  drawn for that year.  In this evaluation, aim is set to m - bi.  Next we form the average 
over the 35 simulated values of  it z  to form the value the agent’s i z .  This value of  i z  is 
then run through Social Security’s benefit formula to calculate the value of ) ( i z h .
13   The 
average of the  ) ( i z h  values across all 100 agents provides our sex-, education-, and 
cohort-specific estimates of ) ( i t z h E .  
 
 
Calculating the Aggregate Value of Benefits  
 
The total value of benefits for Americans age 26 through 60 is calculated by forming 
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Taxes, l i T , , paid by worker i in year l equal the tax rate in year l, l ν , multiplied by worker 
i’s covered wages in year l,  l l i w z , .   
 
                                                 
13 This function includes the early retirement reduction factor since we are computing reduced benefits 
assumed to be taken at age 62.    11
 
(21)     l l i l l i w z T , , ν =  
 
Following the above lines of argument, we can write the time-t value of taxes paid in year 
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To determine the value of it tz E  in (22), we again resort to averaging draws we generate 
from our random-effects model within each sex-, education-, and cohort-specific cell.   
 
Let Ti stand for the remaining lifetime OAI taxes of worker i and  ) ( i t T V  stand for the 
market value of these taxes.  Then,  
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Calculating the Aggregate Value of Taxes 
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3.  Valuing the Wage-Growth Security  
 
The first step in valuing the real wage-growth security is estimating the parameters of 
(11) on data covering 1952 through 2005. We consider two sets of APT-factor 
regressions for estimating our intercept α and the factor loadings (the β coefficients). The 
first set of regressions, reported in table 1, incorporate contemporaneous and lagged 
nominal equity returns of indexes of large and small cap stocks as well as of short- and   12
long-term government nominal bond returns.
14  The second set, reported in table 2, 
substitute contemporaneous and lagged Fama-French factors for the asset-index returns. 
 
When lagged regressors are included, the adjusted R
2s are quite high, ranging from .289 
to .452 across the two tables.  Omitting lagged regressors lowers these values 
dramatically.   The table 1 regressions with lagged returns provide better fits than the 
corresponding table 2 regressions based on Fama-French factors.   
 
For each regression, we used the estimated parameters to calculate the implied present 
value of $1 invested in the wage growth security for 1 and 35 year horizons based on the 
appendix formula (a13).  These valuations are provided in the tables.   
 
Consider the results in table 1, which include lagged regressors and provide the best fits 
to the data.  For a 1-year, $1 wage-growth security, our valuations range from 98.2 cents 
to 99.3 cents.  SSA’s valuation is 1.011 divided by 1.029, or 98.2 cents, based on SSA’s  
assumed 1.1 percent average real-wage growth rate and 2.9 percent real discount rate.  In 
the case of the 35-year, $1 wage-growth security, our table 1 lagged regression valuations 
range from 58.0 cents to 60.4 cents.  The corresponding SSA valuation is (1.011/1.029)
35 
or 53.9 cents.   
 
Clearly the discrepancy between the SSA and APT valuations grows the longer out is the 
wage-growth security’s duration.  This is clear from the first model in table 1. Its 1-year 
wage-growth security valuation is identical to Social Security’s.  But its 35-year 
valuation of 59.4 cents is 10.2 percent higher than SSA’s 53.9 cent figure.  The reason the 
APT and SSA valuations diverge more for longer duration wage-growth securities is due 
to the fact that contemporaneous and past real market returns affect future expected real 
wage growth differently through time in the APT valuation.  This is clear from 
considering how the security’s duration enters into equations (17) and (18).  
 
We base our APT valuations on the regression appearing in the last column in table 1 
(Restricted 2).  This model values the $1, one-year wage-growth security at 98.8 cents 
and the $1, 35-year wage-growth security at 58.8 cents.  Our selection of this model was 
guided by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC, also known as Schwartz’s Criterion) 
and Akaike's information criterion (AIC) as well as Akaike's criterion corrected for 
small-sample bias (AICc).
15  
                                                 
14 Regressing a real growth rate against nominal returns may seem surprising, but the short-term nominal 
bond return is highly correlated with, and thus controls for, the inflation rate.  
15 See Andrews and Monahan (1992), Hurvich and Tsai (1989), and Schwarz (1978). These criteria 
represent ways to trade-off model complexity and goodness-of-fit in model selection. All three criteria are 
increasing in the number of parameters in the model and decreasing in the maximized log-likelihood.  In 
the case of normal errors, the latter can be recast as increasing in the sum of squared residuals. Hence, 
minimization of these criteria is a logical guide for model selection. Furthermore, the use of model 
selection criteria avoids the problems of multiple testing and non-nested model comparison that are 
commonly seen with other approaches. The criteria have similar forms (see Schwartz, 1978 and Hurvich 
and Tsai, 1989), although each behaves somewhat differently. AIC and AICc are based on an information-
theoretic derivation and are asymptotically equivalent to likelihood-based selection. BIC is based on 
Bayesian as well as minimum-description-length arguments and is not asymptotically equivalent to 
selection based purely upon maximized likelihood. This is because BIC penalizes the addition of   13
 
 
4. Modeling Relative Earnings 
 
Table 4 presents parameter estimates by demographic group for our random-effects 
model. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of relative earnings (z). The 
table’s estimated coefficients were used to simulate lifetime paths for relative covered 
earnings as described above.  Our data come from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) for the years 1968 through 1993. We include observations reporting educational 
attainment and positive labor income.
16   
 
Figures 1 and 2 shows the average age-relative earnings profiles for different cohorts 
holding sex and education constant as predicted by table 4’s results.  The profiles tell 
some interesting stories.  First, all the profiles peak between ages 40 and 45 with the 
exception of males with high school educations; their profiles peak in their 30s.  Second, 
the female (male) profiles are significantly higher (lower) for younger cohorts, indicating 
that successive cohorts have experienced a smaller gender gap in earnings.  Third, 
females with college or more education experience relative limited declines in their 
relative earnings after age forty.  Each of the other groups experience very sharp declines.    
 
 
5.  Benefit and Tax Valuations 
 
Tables 5 through 13 show the results of our calculations of benefit and tax values for 
individuals aged 26, 40, and 55 in 2005.  The APT and SSA benefit values are calculated 
based on (17) and (18), respectively.  The APT tax value is calculated based on (23), and 
the SSA tax values are calculated using wage-growth security values analogous to those 
in (18).  Table 14 presents aggregate values of tax and benefits based on (20) and (24).  
 
The values in tables 5 through 13 make sense.  The market values of benefit obligations 
are larger for those with more education, but so are the market values of tax obligations.  
The net liabilities are smaller for those with more education in the case of 26 year olds, 
but larger for the better educated in the case of 40 and 55 year olds.  This simply reflects 
the fact that older workers have all their benefits coming, but only a portion of their 
lifetime taxes left to pay.   
 
The differences in SSA and APT valuations of net liabilities to particular groups can be 
quite sizeable. Take 40 year-old females with a high school education. SSA’s 
methodology places Social Security’s average liability to these women at $39,708, 
whereas the APT valuation is 34 percent higher at $53,253. 
                                                                                                                                                 
parameters more heavily than AIC (the coefficient on the number of parameters is 2 for AIC vs. log(n) for 
BIC). Hence, BIC tends to select more parsimonious models than AIC. 
16 Selecting observations in this manner excluded between 11 and 18 percent of potential observations 
depending on the year in question.  This selection results in an unbalanced panel and raises the issue of 
coefficient bias, although it’s not clear how such bias, were it to exist, would cut with respect to our 
comparison of APT and SSA valuations.     14
 
A final point concerns the absolute size of the benefit obligations to older workers. As 
table 11 shows, whether one uses APT or SSA valuations, the amounts are sizeable when 
set against the relatively small values of financial wealth held by typical older workers.  
 
Table 14 reports our main finding, namely that Social Security’s valuation method 
appears to understate the market value of the net liability to working-age Americans by 
approximately $2 trillion or 23.1 percent.  The main source of this undervaluation 
involves the valuation of benefits.  SSA-based valuation leads to a $13.7 trillion figure, 
whereas APT valuation puts the figure at $15.8 trillion.  This is a $2.1 trillion differential.  
In contrast, the difference in the SSA and APT values of taxes owed by working-age 
Americans is only $.1 trillion.  
 
Were we to value benefits by simply marketing annuities to market (using TIPS rates), 
but retaining SSA’s wage-growth security valuation, we’d arrive at an SSA aggregate 
benefit valuation of $14.9 trillion.  Since doing so would leave the SSA valuation of taxes 
unchanged, it would reduce the SSA valuation of net liabilities to $9.68 trillion.  Hence, 
proper annuity valuation would, by itself, eliminate approximately 60 percent of the 
difference in APT and SSA valuations. Social Security Trustees could, therefore, 
significantly improve their net liability measure simply by using TIPs returns to value the 
system’s promised annuities.  
 
 
6. Critiquing the Approach 
 
There are at least five objections to the approach taken here.  The first is that, given their 
size, any actual attempt to market Social Security’s net liabilities would dwarf the 
financial markets.  Our response is that valuation is a marginal exercise; we routinely 
establish values for total stocks of financial and real assets as well as financial liabilities 
based on the going price in the market.  Take, for example, the Federal Reserve’s Flow of 
Funds valuation of owner-occupied homes.  All of these homes are all carried at marginal 
market price even though the immediate sale of all U.S. homes could greatly alter values.  
Like most homes, Social Security liabilities are currently being held, rather than actively 
traded.   Moreover, although Social Security’s net liabilities are large relative to U.S. net 
worth, they are a small component of total world net worth.  
 
The second objection involves what we take to be the idiosyncratic component of real 
wage growth.  Does the market value this component, which accounts for about half of 
wage growth variability? Arguably not.  If this risk were significant to investors it would, 
presumably, be marketed and priced by the major financial securities we’ve included in 
our analysis.  The opposite view must maintain that financial markets are profoundly 
incomplete and fail to span aggregate risks of major importance to investors.  Were the 
opposite view correct, our results would be incomplete and potentially biased.  But the 
direction of such bias cannot be determined a priori.   
   15
This second objection is reminiscent of the old debate in international trade about 
whether there are more factors of production or goods being produced; it is 
fundamentally unresolvable.  Our position, though, should be clear.  We have a practical 
problem, and we offer a consistent and robust practical solution that closely aligns with 
decades of research in modern asset pricing.  The alternative of relying on economic 
projections of real wages many years in the future is similar to relying on analysts’ 
forecasts of a company’s earnings and the using the resulting discounted cash flow to 
determine the value of the company’s stock rather than simply using its trading price.  
Such practice bets against the market and represents a highly questionable foundation on 
which to base generational and fiscal policy. 
 
The third objection is our failure to take account of potential future policy changes; i.e., 
changes to the h( ) function.  Here we plead guilty; but determining which policy changes 
are likely to arise and the impact on different parties of such changes is not our objective.  
Our objective is valuing Social Security’s net claims taking current policy as given and 
determining whether that policy is sustainable.  Were we instead to incorporate future 
policy changes, our valuation exercise would be trivial; we’d necessarily find the 
government to be intertemporally balanced.  The reason is that along any path the 
economy travels government spending will necessarily be financed by the private sector.  
From this perspective, the government can never be intertemporally insolvent.  That said, 
many of these paths, all of which entail ex-post satisfaction of the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint, will entail terrible economic and fiscal conditions, 
including policy changes described as explicit or implicit defaults. 
 
A fourth objection is that the sum of workers’ valuations of their net Social Security’s 
benefit claims may differ dramatically from the valuation we measure.  As demonstrated 
in Liu, Rettenmaier, and Saving (2007), individual valuations are based on wealth-
equivalent changes in expected utility and take into account workers’ idiosyncratic risks.  
Admittedly, how much today’s workers would be willing to pay to keep Social Security 
is an interesting question.  But that amount is potentially quite different from what the 
market would be willing to pay.
17   
 
Finally, there is the question of relevance. Does it matter if the market thinks a country is 
financially troubled, while its government proclaims its solvency? The answer is surely 
yes. Over the years, scores of countries have experienced abrupt runs on their currencies 
and financial instruments because the market made a decision that their policies were 
unsustainable. Argentina’s 2002 fiscal/financial meltdown, following a decade of 
excellent economic growth, is a good example. This crisis came as a shock to its leaders 
who had forecasts aplenty for how the government was going to reverse its prolonged 
fiscal slide and pay its bills.   
 
 
                                                 
17 The consumption of grapefruit provides a useful analogy.  What workers are willing to pay to have 
access to grapefruit, if the alternative is never eating another grapefruit, is the sum of their consumer 
surplus from grapefruit.  This is not the same as the cost of buying, at market prices, the grapefruit the 
workers intend to consume.    16
7. Conclusion 
 
No one would suggest that the prices of explicit financial securities are independent of 
their risk properties.  Such a proposition would deny fact, let alone theory.  But the same 
financial laws that determine the prices of marketed securities govern the pricing of non-
marketed assets and liabilities; they cannot be priced by treating their variable returns as 
sure things and discounting at safe rates.
18 Nor can safe government payments and 
receipts be valued using discount factors that differ from the discounts associated with 
safe marketed securities.  This, however, has been standard U.S. practice since our 
government began considering its implicit debts.   
 
Were marking to market implicit government liabilities and assets of minor import, the 
government’s ad-hoc valuation methods would be of little concern.  But the example 
considered here – the valuation of Social Security’s net retirement liability to working-
age Americans – suggests the opposite.  Proper asset pricing delivers a measure of this 
net liability that exceeds SSA’s valuation by almost one quarter. 
 
Of course, Social Security’s net retirement liability to working-age Americans is only 
part of its overall implicit debt.  And Social Security is only one part of a much broader 
set of future U.S. government receipts and payments, whose market values need to be 
assessed.  The ultimate goal, in this regard, is valuing all components of the 
government’s intertemporal budget to determine whether its overall current policy is 
sustainable, i.e., whether the government’s entire fiscal enterprise breaks even as a matter 
of present valuation.  Answering this broader question is a much bigger task, but one that 
can surely be approached using techniques similar to those considered here.  
                                                 
18 Fortunately, government officials aren’t asked to value the stock market.  Were they to do so, they’d 
badly misprice the market. Indeed, were Social Security’s valuation method applied to the S&P, its price-
earnings ratio would equal 34.5 – more than twice the ratio observed at our writing.  To see this, note that 
Social Security uses an assumed safe 2.9 percent discount rate for its liability valuations.   Let e stand for 
the expected earnings on the S&P per dollar invested.  Then Social Security would value the S&P by 
setting P, the price per dollar invested, equal to the e/.029; i.e., the value of a perpetual safe stream e 
discounted at 2.9 percent.  Since P = e/.029, P/e = 1/.029 =34.5. 
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Appendix  -- Pricing the Wage-Growth Security 
 
 
Suppose that the real wage follows the growth process: 
 









ε σ β α ε  
 
where f is the vector of priced assets, e.g., the S&P 500, and ε is the process for the residual and unpriced component.  The symbol 
df/f  denotes the total returns (dividends included) on the priced assets. 
 
Converting this into logs we have: 
 






























2 denotes the appropriately subscripted instantaneous variance.
19     
 
For reference, letting Ω denote the instantaneous variance covariance matrix for the returns on the priced assets we have: 
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19 Note, the second term in the log derivatives arises because the process instantaneously has infinite movement and its variance is of order dt.  Since log is 
concave, we have the second order negative correction.   19
 
Now we integrate to obtain the stochastic wage at time T: 
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In other words, the terminal real wage is an exponential in some time terms multiplied by power functions of the total accumulated 
values of the priced assets.  
 
To obtain the current value of the wage at time T, we take the expected discounted value under the martingale measure, i.e., we take 
the expectation of the discounted value assuming that all of the priced assets have an expected growth rate equal to the risk free rate. 
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In the valuation all of the variance terms have dropped out and only the betas and the alpha remain.  The easiest way to understand this 
is to build it up.  Suppose first that there were no betas or they were all zero.  Then the wage will grow at the rate α to T and be 
discounted back at the rate r.  Now suppose there is only one marketed asset and its beta is 1.  Then the wage is just the same as 
something that has the terminal value, w0e
αT, invested in the asset.  In that case the value is just the invested value, w0e
αT, which is 
precisely what the formula gives.  If beta isn’t one, then the formula just corrects for the difference. 
 
 
A Discrete Time Approach 
 
While the above analysis is somewhat formal, the result indicates that a simpler intuitive approach applies.  Furthermore, while the 
above may appear to depend on distributional assumptions, an elementary discrete time analysis will verify that it is in fact 
independent of any such assumptions. 
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In discrete time, we have  
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 To value the future payment of wt+1 we can ask how much we would have to invest in marketed assets to replicate it.  Consider 
investing At in the risky asset and Bt in the riskless asset.  The return on that portfolio will be 
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This will replicate the priced portion for any realization of the returns, fi,t, if 
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The above expression tells us that a claim to one dollar invested in the wage-growth security for one year has an immediate and, 
therefore, sure value of V1.  At the end of one year the expected value of this claim is just V1(1+r).  Having this amount for sure in a 
year also has this same expected value.  The value after one period of investing one dollar for two years in the wage-growth security is 
) 1 (
2
1 r V + .  Discounted to the present, the value is just 
2
1 V . In general, the value, V
T, of a dollar invested in the wage-growth security 
for T years is 
T V1 ; hence we can write 
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which is the continuous time formula.  
 
Some care should be exercised in interpreting formulas a9 and a10.  They would appear to imply that a riskier wage, i.e., one with a 
higher beta would actually be more valuable than a less risky one.  This apparently anomalous result comes about because the return 
on the asset in a6 has not been demeaned.  As a consequence, the intercept, α, is actually the intercept from a demeaned regression, γ, 
less β times the expected return on the asset, 
 
( f ar γ βγ βπ =−Ε =− +)   , 
 
where π is the risk premium on the asset.  Substituting this result into a9 gives 
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which clearly reflects the decline in value with increasing risk.    22
 
 
An Extension to Lagged Variable 
 
Suppose the regression is in discrete terms (e.g., yearly), and we have only lagged variables: 
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A similar analysis produces the amended formula: 
 
 

























which is the same as when the returns are contemporaneous but with the addition of the multiplying term containing the past year's 
returns.    Without concerning ourselves with the issues of a stochastic interest rate, using the term structure of interest rates this 
formula becomes: 
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Extending this analysis to multiple lags is more difficult and explicitly involves the covariance structure of the returns.  As an 
alternative we could change to a different formulation in terms of the unit root process: 
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While this is more difficult to estimate that the usual sort of regression, it allows for a simple valuation equation: 
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We won’t make use of this formulation since our estimations involve a single lag.   24
 
Table 1 
Regression of Average Real Wage Growth on Nominal Returns 
 
Regressor  Unrestricted Model  Contemporaneous Only  Lagged Only  Restricted 1  Restricted 2 










stGovBondReturn  -0.435 
(-5.515) 
-0.025 
(-0.251)    -0.336 
(-2.566)   
ltGovBondReturn  -0.033 
(-2.440) 
0.036 
(1.463)      
largeCapReturn  0.010 
(0.681) 
0.028 
(1.262)      
smCapReturn  -0.006 
(-0.654) 
-0.040 
(-3.403)      
L.stGovBondReturn  0.421 
(3.816)    0.0587 
(0.533) 
0.283 
(2.313)   
L.ltGovBondReturn  0.028 






L.largeCapReturn  0.098 






L.smCapReturn  -0.008 
(-0.657)    0.015 
(-0.230)    
1 yr. Valuation  - $0.993  $0.986  -  $0.988 
35 yr. Valuation  - $0.782  $0.602  -  $0.588 
Residual SE  0.019 0.025 0.019  0.018  0.019 
R
2  0.509 0.105 0.454  0.494  0.450 
Adjusted R
2  0.422 0.0315 0.409  0.452  0.429 
AIC  -264.624 -240.198 -266.887  -270.962  -270.551 
AICc  -259.508 -238.411 -265.100  -269.175  -269.735 
BIC  -244.735 -228.264 -254.953  -259.028  -262.595 
Note: t-scores based on HAC std. errors are in parentheses.  Dependent variable for all regressions is real AWI growth. n = 54. 
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Table 2    Regression of Average Real Wage Growth on Fama-French Factors 
 
Regressor Unrestricted  Model  Contemporaneous 
Only  Lagged Only  Restricted 1  Restricted 2 










MktRF  -0.007 
(-0.8616963) 
-0.006 
(-0.405     
HML  -0.020 
(-1.032) 
-0.023 
(-0.946)     
SMB  -0.009 
(-0.762) 
-0.044 
(-1.445)     
L.MktRF  0.081 






L.HML  -0.006 
(-0.685)    -0.002 
(-0.218)    
L.SMB  -0.014 
(-1.261)    -0.021 
(-1.705) 
-0.021 
(-0.936)   
1 yr. Valuation  -  $0.993 $0.994 $0.994 $0.994 
35 yr. Valuation  -  $0.770 $0.623 $0.621 $0.623 
Residual SE  0.021 0.025 0.021 0.020 0.020 
R
2  0.369 0.0769 0.356  0.355  0.343 
Adjusted R
2  0.289 0.0215 0.317  0.330  0.330 
AIC  -255.111 -240.553 -259.959 -261.948 -262.893 
AICc  -251.911 -239.303 -258.709 -261.131 -262.413 
BIC  -239.199 -230.608 -250.014 -253.992 -256.926 
Note: t-scores based on HAC std. errors are in parentheses.  Dependent variable for all regressions is real AWI growth. n= 54. 
 




Table 3  
 
Social Security Valuation Elements 
 
  Annuity Factor  Early Retirement 
Reduction Factor 
Discount for Waiting from 60 to 62 
to Start Collecting Benefits  2006 Average Wage 
APT  15.43 0.7  0.961  $  36,953 
SSA  14.18 0.7  0.944  $  36,953   27
 
                    Table 4                                       Coefficient Estimates from Random Effects Model of Relative Earnings 
 Males  Females 
Regressor  Less than High School High School College or Greater  Less than High School High School College or Greater 
-4.790 -3.903  -8.982  -4.991 -8.380  -7.538 
Intercept 
(0.334) (0.479)  (0.229) (0.268)  (0.186) (0.246) 
0.270 0.069  0.635  0.213 0.535  0.430 
Age 
(0.026) (0.037)  (0.02)  (0.022) (0.016) (0.021) 
0.002 0.003  0.005  0.008 0.002  0.005 
age*year of birth 
(6.5e-04) (7.4e-04)  (5.3e-04)  (6.1e-04) (4.2e-04)  (5.1e-04) 
-0.005 8.946e-04  -0.014  -0.003  -0.010 -0.008 
age2 
(6.7e-04) (9.4e-04)  (5.5e-04)  (6.0e-04) (4.3e-04)  (5.8e-04) 
-2.626e-05 -1.176e-05  -1.525e-04  -1.405e-04 -3.303e-05  -9.978e-05 
age2*year of birth 
(1.2e-05) (1.3e-05)  (1.1e-05)  (1.1e-05) (8.0e-06)  (9.3e-06) 
2.572e-05 -2.463e-05  9.857e-05  1.031e-05 5.515e-05  5.246e-05 
age3 
(5.5e-06) (7.6e-06)  (5.0e-06)  (5.3e-06) (3.8e-06)  (5.2e-06) 
1.740e-07 -2.560e-07  1.461e-06  7.314e-07 2.164e-07  7.167e-07 
age3*year of birth 
(8.3e-08) (9.4e-08)  (7.8e-08)  (7.3e-08) (5.3e-08)  (6.1e-08) 
-0.071 -0.059  -0.061  -0.113 -0.045  -0.059 
Year of birth 
(0.012) (0.014)  (0.008) (0.01)  (0.007) (0.008) 
# of Observations  11972 22514  29230  8529  23539  25570 
# of Individuals  2513 4133  4282  2055 4356  4465 
Std. Dev. of Random Effect  0.831 0.738  0.664  1.0363  0.827  0.797 
Std. Dev. of Residual  0.841 0.788  0.786  0.966 0.972  0.969 





          Table 5                                           Social Security’s Benefit Obligations to 26 Year-Olds 
 
Gender  Valuation  Less than High School  High School  College or More 
APT  $52,884.39 $57,823.68 $87,621.58 
Males 
SSA  $43,811.28 $47,903.16 $72,588.78 
APT  $62,439.88 $91,625.04  $100,734.87  Females 
SSA  $51,727.38 $75,905.38 $83,452.29 
 
         Table 6                                             Social Security’s Tax Claims on 26 Year-Olds 
 
Gender  Valuation  Less than High School  High School  College or More 
APT  $38,692.79 $45,867.30 $84,817.32 
Males 
SSA  $37,183.86 $44,364.69 $81,613.33 
APT  $47,132.75 $82,988.78 $95,301.44  Females 
SSA  $45,222.06 $79,694.66 $91,402.69 
 
         Table 7                                                  Social Security’s Net Liability to 26 Year-Olds 
 
Gender  Valuation  Less than High School  High School  College or More 
APT  $14,191.61 $11,956.39  $2,804.26 
Males 
SSA  $6,627.42 $3,538.48 -$9,024.55 
APT  $15,307.13 $8,636.25  $5,433.43  Females 





          Table 8                                        Social Security’s Benefit Obligations to  40 Year-Olds 
 
Gender  Valuation  Less than High School  High School  College or More 
APT  $78,541.11 $87,817.08  $119,659.09 
Males 
SSA  $67,250.16 $75,192.63  $102,457.08 
APT  $73,688.46 $102,193.70  $117,059.56  Females 
SSA  $63,095.12 $87,502.49  $100,231.26 
 
         Table 9                                             Social Security’s Tax Claims on 40 Year-Olds 
 
Gender  Valuation  Less than High School  High School  College or More 
APT  $32,986.24 $33,524.46 $63,463.14 
Males 
SSA  $32,239.18 $32,791.23 $62,056.14 
APT  $31,548.85 $48,940.34 $61,163.53  Females 
SSA  $30,824.90 $47,794.78 $59,663.88 
 
         Table 10                                                  Social Security’s Net Liability to 40 Year-Olds 
 
Gender  Valuation  Less than High School  High School  College or More 
APT  $45,554.87 $54,292.62 $56,195.95 
Males 
SSA  $35,010.98 $42,401.40 $40,400.94 
APT  $42,139.60 $53,253.36 $55,896.04  Females 





          Table 11                                            Social Security’s Benefit Obligations to 55 Year-Olds 
 
Gender  Valuation  Less than High School  High School  College or More 
APT  $133,480.47 $151,434.14 $186,439.44 
Males 
SSA  $118,406.64 $134,332.82 $165,385.00 
APT  $96,713.49 $124,821.42  $150,533.59  Females 
SSA  $85,791.72 $110,725.45  $133,533.97 
 
         Table 12                                             Social Security’s Tax Claims on 55 Year-Olds 
 
Gender  Valuation  Less than High School  High School  College or More 
APT  $9,845.27 $11,380.19  $17,337.79 
Males 
SSA  $9,765.11 $11,285.27  $17,197.26 
APT  $7,211.85 $11,028.50  $16,192.97  Females 
SSA  $7,153.73 $10,936.99  $16,055.42 
 
         Table 13                                                  Social Security’s Net Liability to 55 Year-Olds 
 
Gender  Valuation  Less than High School  High School  College or More 
APT  $123,635.20 $140,053.95 $169,101.65 
Males 
SSA  $108,641.53 $123,047.55 $148,187.74 
APT  $89,501.64 $113,792.92  $134,340.62  Females 






Table 14                Social Security’s Aggregate Net Liability to Working-Age Americans 
 
  APT SSA 
Aggregate Benefits 
Owed by Social Security 
$ 15.765 trillion  $ 13.676 trillion 
Aggregate Tax Obligations  
Owed to Social Security 
$ 5.333 trillion  $ 5.199 trillion 
Social Security’s  
Aggregate Net Liability 
$ 10.433 trillion  $ 8.477 trillion 
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Figure 1  Relative-Earnings Profiles of Males 
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Figure 2  Relative-Earnings Profiles of Females 
 
 
 
 